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Supreme Court of Vanuatu |
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IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF
VANUATU
(Civil Jurisdiction)
Civil Case No. 93 of 2007
BETWEEN:
JACK
UMOU
Claimant
AND:
ERROMANGO
ISLAND LAND TRIBUNAL
Defendant
Coram: Justice C. N. Tuohy
Counsels: Mr. Yawah for
the Claimant
Mr. Nalyal for the Defendant
Date of Hearing: 3 June
2008
Date of Decision: 8 August 2008
RESERVED
JUDGMENT
1. This is an application which invokes the Court’s
supervisory jurisdiction under section 39 of the Customary Land Tribunal
Act No.
7 of 2001 in relation to a decision of the defendant which declared Samuel Narai
the true custom owner of "Ponive" land
on North Erromango.
2. It is useful to set out the section at the
beginning as it prescribes the limits of the Court’s powers.
"39 Supervision of land tribunals by Supreme Court
(1) If a person who is not qualified to be a member or a secretary of a land tribunal participates in the proceedings of the tribunal, a party to the dispute may apply to the Supreme Court for an order:
(a) to discontinue the proceedings before the tribunal or to cancel its decision; and
(b) to have the dispute determined or re-determined by a differently constituted land tribunal.
(2) If a land tribunal fails to follow any of the procedures under this Act, a party to the dispute may apply to the Supreme Court for an order:
(a) to discontinue the proceedings before the tribunal or to cancel its decision; and
(b) to have the dispute determined or re-determined by a differently constituted land tribunal.
(3) The Supreme Court in determining an application may make such other orders as it considers necessary.
(4) Subject to the Constitution, the decision of the Supreme Court on any application:
(a) is final and conclusive; and
(b) is not to be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed, set aside or called in question in any court on any ground."
3. The hearing was a rehearing
which was held pursuant to a consent order of this Court in Civil Case No. 9 of
2006. It took place
at Port Narvin on 31 May and 1 June 2007.
4. The
claimant asks the Court to quash the Tribunal’s decision on 3 grounds:-
(a) The required Notice of the hearing was given before the establishment of the tribunal in breach of the procedures set up by the Act.
(b) Two of the judges had been observers at the previous hearing and this disqualified them from acting as judges at this hearing.
(c) The Chairman of the previous Tribunal Mike Uyori was seen talking to the judges so this was unfair.
5. All 3 issues
were canvassed in the sworn statements filed by the claimant although his
counsel’s written submissions were
directed to the first point only. The
Court will deal with all three.
6. The
"Notice of Rehearing" was in evidence.
It very clearly identified the case and the tribunal. It provided:-
"21 DAYS NOTICE BLONG HEARING IA I STAT LONG NUMBER 2 MAY 2007 KASSEM 22 MAY 2007. MITING BAE I OPEN LONG 22 MAY 2007 KASEM 24 MAY 2007. TIME 8.00 AM TO 3.00 PM.
PLACE BLONG MEETING EMI LONG PORT NARVIN VILLAGE, NORTH EAST ERROMANGO.
ERROMANGO ISLAND LAND TRIBUNAL ISTAP APPEAL LONG TUFALA PARTIES CONCERN BLONG STAP LONG PLES BLONG MEETING LONG DEIT IA."
It was signed by David Naling,
Chairman, Erromango Island Land Tribunal. The notice was displayed in both Port
Narvin Village and
Dillons Bay Village where the claimant lives. The evidence
does not disclose specifically the day it was put up but I infer that
it was on
2 May.
7. David Naling had by letter dated 2 May 2007 been appointed
chairman by the paramount Council of Chiefs of Erromango Island called
Erromango
Natmonuk Simanlou Council of Chiefs, signed by the Chairman of that Council,
Mike Uyori who had also been the Chairman
of the previous tribunal. On the same
day, Mr. Naling wrote directly to the parties, Jack Umou Family and Samuel Narai
Family to
advise the date of hearing and the costs which each party had to pay.
There is no suggestion that the claimant did not actually receive
notice of the
hearing on or about 2 May.
8. In fact the hearing did not start on 22
May. On 29 May Erromango Simanlou held a meeting at which the judges for the
rehearing
were appointed. They were:-
David Narai (Chairman)
Andrew Naimai
Joe Yokre
John Ativi
Bill Nivselu (Secretary)
9. The Tribunal
commenced its hearing on 31 May. At the outset, the claimant objected to the
hearing proceeding. His objection appears
to have been based on a belief that
the case was still before this Court. The objection did not relate to the notice
of hearing.
After adjourning to consider the objection, the Tribunal rejected it
and resumed the hearing.
10. The other party Samuel Narai then presented
his evidence which consisted of a considerable number of witnesses as well as
himself.
The claimant, who was present throughout the hearing, was asked to
present his claim and his witnesses. He declined to do so. One
of his witnesses
Joe Kohwe, answered questions which the judges directed to the claimant but the
claimant provided no evidence of
the basis for his claim to custom ownership of
Ponive land despite being given ample opportunity to do so. At the end of the 2
day
hearing, the Tribunal gave its decision.
11. The claimant’s
argument about the 21 day notice is based upon section 25 of the Act which
provides:-
"25. Notice of hearing
(1) Within 21 days after the establishment of a land tribunal, the secretary of the land tribunal must give notice under subsection (2) to the parties to the dispute.
(2) The notice must:
(a) be in writing in Bislama, French, English or another language of the one or more of the parties to the dispute; and
(b) specify the date and time of the meeting of the land tribunal to hear the dispute; and
(c) the place of meeting of the land tribunal, being a place which is convenient having regard to the location of the land, the residences of the tribunal’s members, the residences of the parties and the availability and security of meeting places; and
(d) the name and address of the secretary of the land tribunal; and
(e) if applicable – the grounds of the appeal."
12. Section 26 is also relevant.
"26. Start of hearing and objections
(1) The land tribunal must, so far as practicable, meet to hear a dispute at the time and on the date and at the place specified in the notice given under section 25.
(2) Whenever a land tribunal first meets to hear a dispute, the chairperson must:
(a) open the meeting with a prayer; and
(b) introduce himself or herself, the other members and the secretary of the land tribunal; and
(c) ask if there are any objections to the qualification of the chairperson, any of the other members or the secretary.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), the chairperson must consider any objection, and if he or she considers that the objection is justified, he or she must disqualify the person concerned and adjourn the meeting to enable another person to be appointed.
(4) If the objection is to the chairperson of the land tribunal, the other members of the tribunal must consider the objection, and if they consider that the objection is justified, they must disqualify the chairperson and adjourn the meeting to enable another chairperson to be appointed.
(5) If a party to a dispute fails to follow any of the procedures under this Act, another party to the dispute may apply to the land tribunal for an order directing the party to comply with the procedure."
13. The claimant argues that the
Tribunal was only established when the members (other than the Chairman) were
appointed by Erromango
Simanlou only a day or two before the hearing started.
Therefore the notice was given before the establishment of the Tribunal not
within 21 days after it.
14. The defendant argued that this was a
rehearing, not a new claim, and that the Tribunal was actually established in
2005 prior
to the first hearing. All that happened at the Simanlou Council
hearing of 29 May is that the Council chose new judges to sit on
the Tribunal.
Discussion
15. The
process is set out in Part 5 of the Act. It starts with the giving of a notice
of appeal under section 22 to the Chairman
of the Island Council against a lower
tribunal’s decision. Under section 23, the Chairman must then convene a
meeting of the
Simanlou within 21 days. Simanlou must then establish an island
land tribunal to determine the appeal: section 22 (2). The procedure
for
appointment of the members where, as in Erromango, there is only one custom area
is set out in section 22 (3) and (4). Reading
section 22 as a whole it is clear
that "establishing" an island land
tribunal in terms of section 22 (2) means appointing its members pursuant to (in
this case) section 22 (3) and (4).
Obviously the original tribunal was
established in 2005.
16. Rehearings are dealt with in section 24 of the
Act. Section 24 (1) gives any party to appeal to an island land tribunal an
absolute
right to a rehearing on giving notice within 21 days of the
announcement of the original decision. Section 24 (3) requires the chairperson
of the island council of chiefs on receiving such a notice to then convene a
meeting of the council within 21 days. Section 24 (4)
provides that the island
council
"must establish another island land tribunal to rehear the dispute. The island land tribunal is to conduct the rehearing as if it was hearing and determining the dispute for the first time".
17. What happened in this case does not fit
exactly into the process outlined above. The rehearing was not initiated by a
notice under
section 24 of the Act. It was initiated by a consent order which
simply said "the land dispute the subject of
this proceeding be heard by a differently constituted Erromango Island Land
Tribunal". It did not specifically state that the procedure set out in
section 24 was to apply. However the consent order could not be effective
without a process for constituting the different tribunal so to make sense of
the order, it must be assumed that the process in section
24 was to apply.
18. It follows from the above that the Tribunal which reheard this
dispute was established only when its members were appointed at
the Simanlou
meeting held on 29 May.
19. However both parties in this case appear to
be under the misapprehension, that there must be 21 days notice given of a
hearing
or rehearing. A careful reading of section 25 (1) set out above shows
that that is not so. The 21 days refers to the period within
which notice must
be given after the tribunal is established, not the length of the notice. There
is no length of time fixed for
the notice. No doubt it must be one which is
reasonable in the circumstances to enable a party to prepare for the hearing.
20. The submission made by the claimant is technically correct. The
notice of hearing was not given within the 21 day period after
the establishment
of the tribunal, it was given about 28 days before. In reality though, the
claimant had ample time to prepare his
case. Furthermore he and his witnesses
were there. The only thing had had little notice of was the membership of the
tribunal.
21. There is no doubt though that he had enough time to decide
whether he would object to the membership. The claimant said in his
first sworn
statement, as did his witness Albea Frank, that he did object to judges Andrew
and John who were observers at the previous
tribunal hearing. The Tribunal did
not accept that objection.
22. In the view of the Court, the Tribunal
was right not to accept the objection. There is no evidence that judges Andrew
and John
played any part in the earlier hearing, either as witnesses or judges.
It is no basis to find bias simply because they may have heard
the evidence or
some of it before as observers.
23. Nor is there an substance in the
complaint about Mike Uyori. There is no evidence that he was talking to the
members of the Tribunal
about the case before them. The hearing took place over
2 days. The fact that at some unspecified time during these 2 days, a member
or
members of the Tribunal were seen speaking to him is no sufficient basis for
inferring that in some way, their decision was tainted.
Allegations of bias of
this nature must be looked at with common sense and in the light of the
realities of living in a village.
24. All in all, I am satisfied that
there was no actual unfairness in the way this rehearing took place. On the
contrary, reading
the well kept minutes, I am impressed by the fairness with
which the rehearing was conducted. In that light, I have to consider whether
the
technical breach of section 25 (1) requires the Court to overturn the
Tribunal’s decision.
25. Section 39 is curiously worded. It does
not directly say what the Court is to do if one of the matters in the section is
made
out. However it does not require the Court to make one of the orders which
it is empowered by the section to make. I consider that
it was Parliament's
intention to give the Court a discretion. It is very unlikely that Parliament
would have wished the Court to
overturn an Island Land Tribunal decision on the
basis of some minor and inconsequential irregularity in procedure. I consider
that
that is what has happened in this case. The claimant actually had full
opportunity to present his case but chose not to. His allegations
of bias also
have no substance. In the exercise of the Court’s discretion, I decline to
make any order disturbing the decision
of the Tribunal.
26. The
application is dismissed. The defendant is entitled to costs which are to be
fixed by the Court if not agreed.
DATED at Port Vila, this 8th day of August, 2008.
C.
N. TUOHY
Judge.
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