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IN
THE SUPREME COURT
OF
THE REPUBLIC OF
VANUATU
(Civil
Jurisdiction)
Civil Case No. 20 of 2007
BETWEEN:
MR.
ERICK AKE
Claimant
AND:
VANUATU
LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
LIMITED
Defendant
Coram: Justice C.N. Tuohy
Counsels:
No appearance for
Claimant
Mr. Malcolm for
Defendant
Date of Ruling: 9 May
2007
Date of Decision: 9 May
2007
RULING
1. Mr. Malcolm for the
defendant has made an application at the first conference for this claim to be
struck out in its entirety as
being statute-barred. The history of the
proceeding is this:
On 15
February 2007 the claim was filed. A Defence was filed on 6 March 2007. That
defence specifically pleaded in paragraph 8 that
the claim is statute-barred by
reason of the Limitation Act No. 4 of 1991. On 15 March 2007 the Court issued a
Notice of Conference
for Wednesday 9 May 2007 at 8am. The Court record shows
that that notice was placed in the boxes of both counsel (Mr. Yawha &
Mr.
Malcom) at 9:00am on 16 March
2007.
2. On 20 April 2007 the
defendant filed a formal written application for an order the claim be struck
out in its entirety as being
statue barred together with a sworn statement in
support. The claimant has today filed a sworn statement of service which
indicates
that the application and sworn statement in support were served on the
claimant’s address for service on 4 May 2007. (The sworn
statement
contains an obvious mistake in that the date of service is given as 4 March
rather than 4 May, however, Mr. Malcolm has
confirmed that obvious mistake and
undertaken to file a replacement sworn statement of service with correct date).
3. When the conference was called
to commence just after 8am this morning, only Mr. Malcolm was present. The Court
waited for another
10 minutes for Mr. Yawha to appear but he did not. The Court
asked Mr. Malcolm to telephone Mr. Yawha. Mr. Malcolm advised that he
had
already tried to telephone him in the office but he was not there. His office
advised that they did not know where he was but
that he was in Tanna either
today or yesterday. There is no other practical way of finding out where he is
and why he is not at this
conference. The Court concludes that he has been given
an opportunity to attend but has chosen not to. In those circumstances, I
have
decided that it is fair and appropriate to consider the application to strike
out.
4. It ought to be noted that
the application is not simply to strike out the statement of claim but is
intended to be an application
to strike out the claim altogether. It is also to
be noted that the limitation defence was clearly pleaded in the statement of
defence
and it is very clearly the basis of the application to strike out. This
distinguishes this case from
Kalses –v- Le
Manganese de Vate Limited CAC 34 of 2003
(11 June 2004) [2004] VUCA8.
5.
Returning to the substance of the application, the claim appears to be founded
upon the tort of conversion. The allegation is that
the claimant’s cattle
entered the defendant’s paddocks "on about 1996 up to 1999". The effect of
the statement of claim,
which is not particularly clear, is that the conversion
is alleged to have taken place when the cattle entered the defendant’s
paddocks. The limitation period for the tort of conversion under section 3 (1)
(a) of the Limitation Act No. 4 of 1991 is 6 years.
At the latest therefore the
limitation period had expired by 1 January 2006. Therefore any claim of
conversion is statute-barred.
6.
Although it is not clear, is possible that the claim contains an alternative
cause of action based on contract. This may arise
from paragraph 4 which states
that "at all material times, the claimant had an understanding agreement with
the defendant company
to return any cattle to enter party (sic) suppose it
trespasses to each others fence". This is probably better read on the basis
that
that allegation is part of the particulars supporting the claim of conversion
because it is referred to again in paragraph 6
(4) "fail to honour the
agreements of returning the herds/cattles" as a particular of the unlawful
retention of the herd.
7.
However, looking at the matter in the most favourable light for the claimant it
may be that one can read it as a separate claim
in contract. The cause of action
in contract arises on breach. Here any breach must be a failure to return the
cattle. Such failure
must have occurred at the very latest before the end of the
2000, assuming that one has a year to return a cow. The limitation period
in
contract is also 6 years. Any claim in contract is also statute-barred.
Therefore the claim is struck out in its entirety.
8. The defendants are entitled to
costs which I fix at VT50,
000.
Dated AT
PORT VILA on 9 May 2007
BY THE COURT
C.
N.
TUOHY
Judge
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