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IN
THE SUPREME
COURT
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF
VANUATU
(Civil
Jurisdiction)
Civil Case No. 116 of 2001
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL
GEORGE NICHOLAS
First
Plaintiff
AND:
DIANA
MAY NICHOLAS
Second
Plaintiff
AND:
TIMOTHY
ROBIN THIES
First Defendant
AND:
LYNNE
CHRISTINE ELDER
Second
Defendant
&
Civil Case No. 96 of 2001
AND:
TIMOTHY
ROBIN THIES & LYNNE CHRISTINE
ELDER
Plaintiff
AND:
GEORGE
VASARIS & CO
Defendant
Mr. Ozols for
Claimants
Mr. Thies in
person
Mr. Sugden for Ms.
Elder
ORDERS
Civil Case no. 116/2001
involves a claim by the Claimants Mr. and Mrs. Nicholas against the Defendants
Mr. Thies and Ms. Elder in
relation to a claim for damages for breach of
contract in relation to a sale of the resort island of Erakor, near Port
Vila
Civil Case no. 96/2001
involves a claim by Mr. Thies and Ms Elder against George Vasaris & Co for
the recovery of the deposit
paid by the Claimants into the legal firm of George
Vasaris & Co in relation to the same contractual
arrangement.
In relation to
CC116/2001 the Defendants counterclaimed against the Claimants but that
counterclaim was dismissed because they failed
to comply with an order for
payment of security for costs. Once the Defendants' counterclaim was struck out,
the Claimants applied
to discontinue their action.
Mr. Ozols has acted throughout
for the Claimants in CC116/01. Until the morning of the hearing, Mr. Sugden had
acted for the First
Defendant, Mr. Thies and the Second Defendant Ms. Elder but
at the commencement of the hearing, the Court was advised that he no
longer
acted for Mr. Thies who wished to represent himself, although Mr. Sugden
retained instruction for Ms. Elder. Mr. Sugden likewise
acted throughout for Mr.
Thies and Ms. Elder in CC96/01. George Vasaris & Co did not enter an
appearance and had indicated that
they did not wish to appear at the hearing and
did not seek costs against the Claimants but sought indemnity from Mr. and Mrs.
Nicholas
against any costs order made. Mr. Thies represented himself in that
case also.
Before the argument as
to costs was embarked upon the parties sought clarification about the Claimants'
application in discontinuing
the action under CC116/2001. Mr. Thies objected to
the application on the basis that Rule 9.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules No. 49
of 2002 provides as follows: -
"(1) The Claimant may discontinue his or her claim at any time and for any reason.
(2) To discontinue, the claimant must:
(a) file a Notice of Discontinuance in Form 18; and
(b) serve the notice on all other parties
(3) If there are several defendants:
(a) the claimant may discontinue against one or some only; and
(b) the claimant's claim continues in force against the others.
(4) If the claimant discontinues:
(a) the claimant may not revive the claim; and
(b) a defendant's counterclaim continues in force; and
(c) the party against whom the claimant discontinued may apply to the court for costs against the claimant."
Mr.
Thies submitted that as the Claimants had never filed a notice of discontinuance
but had filed an application for an order that
the case be discontinued their
procedure was invalid. Mr. Sugden did not join that submission. Mr. Ozols had no
submissions to make.
I ruled that
the filing of that application for an order that the case be discontinued was
tantamount to the Claimant filing a notice
of discontinuance. Despite the fact
that the application for an order that the case be discontinued was not in form
18, I did not
consider that that was significant and I exercised my discretion
in ordering that CC116/2001 was
discontinued.
Another preliminary
point was then raised by Mr. Sugden for Ms. Elder and by Mr. Thies who submitted
that I should step aside and
disqualify myself from hearing and ruling upon
costs in each of the cases because I had delivered a decision in [2003] VUSC 3;
CC73/02
Troy
& Jasmine Neel v
Blake
& ors on 3 October 2003 which dealt
with the subsequent sale of the Erakor resort to the Neels by the Nicholases
during which I had made
credibility findings on the Claimants in CC116/01 and
had made other factual findings that Mr. Thies and Ms Elder considered could
influence my decision on costs in the present
cases.
Mr. Ozols submitted that
Mr. Thies and Ms. Elder were game playing, that there were different issues
involved, that was not a moral
issue and that red herrings were being raised and
that the issues as to costs in these cases were
different.
It was my view that I
should disqualify myself from hearing the question of costs even at such a late
stage because it was clear that
justice must not only be done but must be seen
to be done and a reasonable, impartial observer could reach the conclusion that
my
ruling on costs had been influenced by my findings in the case of
Neel v
Blake. Necessarily the issues involved in
that trial somewhat touched upon the issues involved in the present actions
involving the earlier
deposit for the purchase of the resort by Mr. Thies and
Ms. Elder and that circumstance was dealt with in part in the judgment and
was
part of the findings of fact together with what had occurred as a result of
removing a caution from the leasehold title of the
resort. I must confess that I
myself had experienced some unease at being involved in the determination when I
read the detailed
submissions filed by
counsel.
Had there been no
alternative judge available to deal with the question of costs and had I
necessarily have had to continue with it
I would have done so however, there is
an alternative judge available to deal with the costs issue who has no knowledge
or involvement
with any of the
actions.
In passing I note that
the learned Chief Justice had earlier been involved in CC96/2001 being the
action between Mr. Thies and Ms.
Elder and George Vasaris & Co and had made
certain orders which has resulted in the action under CC116/2001 being commenced
and
had also dealt with an earlier trial between the parties when orders for
specific performance were sought at an earlier stage. It
is equally
inappropriate, in my view, for the Chief Justice to be involved in the question
of setting costs in these cases and for
those reasons it became clear that
Justice Bulu was the appropriate judicial officer to deal with the question in
the face of opposition
to my continuing to do so from two of the
parties
Accordingly, I decided
that I must disqualify myself from the determination and pass the matter onto
Justice Bulu for determination
in due course. The first step that the learned
justice will need to take is to set a conference when the question of a hearing
date
can be fixed at a date and time suitable to him and the
parties.
Dated
AT PORT VILA, this 25th day of February 2004
BY THE COURT
P.
I.
TRESTON
Judge
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