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Supreme Court of Vanuatu |
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IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF
VANUATU
(Criminal Jurisdiction)
Criminal Case No. 40 of 2002
JOE HARRY
-v-
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
On 21st
August 2002 the defendant was convicted before the Magistrate’s Court of
using threatening or abusive words or threatening
gestures towards another,
contrary to section 121 Penal Code. He was fined Vt8, 000 and ordered to pay
Vt2000 in costs. He appeals against that conviction on three grounds.
1. He was denied representation
2. The evidence did not support the conviction
3. There were fundamental procedural irregularities
1.
Representation
The
appellant could not afford a lawyer. He asked that a particular friend represent
him. The prosecution objected to the friend and
the Court upheld that
objection.
There were two grounds of objection, firstly the friend had a
previous conviction and secondly there were civil proceedings involving
the
complainant and the friend and, indeed, an injunction against the friend in
those proceedings. The allegation in the criminal
case arose indirectly out of
those proceedings.
The appellant says the Court was wrong to do that. The
fact there was an adjournment for a week for him to find a lawyer or, if
possible,
obtain the services of the Public Solicitor didn’t remedy
matters. In the end, he was tried without a lawyer.
Section 117 Criminal
Procedure Code states:-
“117 (a) Any person accused of an offence before any criminal court or against whom proceedings are instituted under this Code in any such court, may of right be defended by an advocate.
(b) In any Magistrate’s Court, such person may be defended, with leave of the Court, by an agent or friend.”
The Magistrate, when
deciding whether or not to grant leave under subsection (b) is exercising a
discretion. So long as only proper
factors are taken into account, relevant
factors are not ignored and the decision is not manifestly unreasonable an
appeal Court
will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
I
find that the previous conviction of the friend and his involvement in civil
proceedings connected with the complainant were both
factors the Magistrate
could properly take into account. Whilst the conviction might not have been too
serious it concerned the obstruction
of a maritime officer. The civil
proceedings involved maritime matters and the appellant, a journalist, was
making enquiries about
those matters.
In these circumstances I can see
nothing wrong in the way the Magistrate exercised his discretion. I dismiss this
ground of appeal.
2. The
Evidence.
The Magistrate had the benefit of hearing all the
witnesses. It was open to him to believe some and not others. A close
examination
of the documents shows that the assessment of the witnesses and the
factual findings the Magistrate made were entirely open to him.
There were some
inconsistencies between most witnesses. This in itself does not mean evidence
should be rejected, or one version
be acceptable in preference to
another.
I dismiss this ground of appeal.
3.
Procedural
irregularities.
It was agreed that there had been no compliance
with section 81, 88 and 136 Criminal Procedure Code.
Section 81
states:-
“In every criminal trial in which a plea of not guilty has been entered, the judicial officer presiding shall, before the prosecution case is opened, read aloud to the accused the following statement of the presumption of innocence -
‘In this trial you will be presumed to be innocent unless and until the prosecution has proved your guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is not your task to prove your innocence. If at the end of the trial, any reasonable doubt exists as to your guilt, you will be deemed to be innocent of the charge and will be acquitted’
and shall record such step in the proceedings.”
Section 88
states:-
“In every trial in which a plea of not guilty has been entered, at the close of the case for the prosecution, and if the court shall decide that there is a prima facie case made out against the accused, the presiding judicial officer shall read aloud to the accused, whether or not he is represented by an advocate, the following statement -
‘In making your defence in this trial, you are entitled, in addition to calling other persons as witnesses, to give evidence yourself on your own behalf, upon oath or affirmation and subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. However you are not obliged to give evidence and may elect instead to remain silent. If you do not choose to give evidence, this will not of itself lead to an inference of guilt against you’
and shall record this step in the proceedings.”
Section 136
states:-
“(1) If at the close of the evidence in support of the charge, it appears to the court that a case is made out against the accused person sufficiently to require him to make a defence, the court shall again explain the substance of the charge to the accused and after complying with the requirements of section 88, ask him whether he has any witnesses to examine or other evidence to adduce in his defence, and the court shall then hear any such witnesses and other evidence.
(2) If the accused person states that he has witnesses to call but that they are not present in court and the court is satisfied that the absence of such witnesses is not due to any fault or neglect of the accused person and that there is a likelihood that they could, if present, give material evidence on his behalf, the court may adjourn the trial and issue process or take other steps to compel the attendance of such witnesses.”
The appellant says he
is not a lawyer, does not know Court procedure, he was waiting to be called to
give evidence and was not aware
of the options available and their
effect.
The respondent cited section 221 Criminal Procedure Code
(Amendment) Act No. 13 of 1989 which states:-
“Subject to the provisions herein before contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the summons, warrant, charge, information, order, judgment or other proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission or irregularity has in fact occasioned a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.”
Compliance with
sections 81, 88 and 136 clearly fall within
“other proceedings under this
Code”.
The respondent argues that when one looks at the
evidential findings of the Magistrate the framing of his judgment and the
conduct
of the appellant through the trial there has been no “substantial
wrong or miscarriage of justice” occasioned by these
omissions.
I
do not accept that. The appellant wanted some kind of help to conduct his case.
His friend, quite properly, was precluded from helping.
He could not obtain
representation through lack of finance and the unavailability of the Public
Solicitor. The defendant didn’t
give evidence although he called two
witnesses. There were no legal points, there were issues of credibility and
reliability.
I accept that section 221 might be applied in cases where
there are failures to comply with section 81, 88 and 136. However, in this
case,
given the failures to comply I cannot with any certainty say there has not been
a “substantial wrong or miscarriage of
justice”.
In these
circumstances I must quash the conviction and set aside the
sentence.
Dated at Port Vila, this
24th
day of January 2003.
R.J.
COVENTRY
Judge
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF
VANUATU
(Criminal Jurisdiction)
Criminal Case No. 40 of 2002
JOE HARRY
-v-
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
ORDER
1. The conviction of the defendant by the Magistrates
Court on 21st August 2002 is
quashed and the sentence set aside.
2. No order is made for
retrial.
3. The defendant is bound over in the sum of Vt10, 000 for 12
months.
Dated
24th
January 2003.
R.J.
COVENTRY
Judge
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