Pacific Islands Treaty Series

STATUS REPORT

THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

[TEST-BAN TREATY CTBT]

(New York, 24/09/1996)

ENTRY INTO FORCE : SEE ARTICLE XIV

Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations

(Unless otherwise indicated, the declarations and reservations were made upon ratification.)

China [up]

Declarations made upon signature

1. China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It is in favor of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon test explosions in the process towards this objective. China is deeply convinced that the CTBT will facilitate nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, China supports the conclusion, through negotiation, of a fair, reasonable and verifiable treaty with universal adherence and unlimited duration and is ready to take active measures to promote its ratification and entry into force

2. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government solemnly makes the following appeals

(1) Major nuclear weapon states should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence. States with huge nuclear arsenals should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear stockpiles

(2) All countries that have deployed nuclear weapons on foreign soil should withdraw all of them to their own land. All nuclear weapon states should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, commit themselves unconditionally to the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear weapon-free zones, and conclude, at an early date, international legal instruments to this effect

(3) All nuclear weapon states should pledge their support to proposals for the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones, respect their status as such and undertake corresponding obligations

(4) No country should develop or deploy space weapon systems or missile defence systems undermining strategic security and stability

(5) An international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be concluded through negotiations

3. The Chinese Government endorses the application of verification measures consistent with the provisions of the CTBT to ensure its faithful implementation and at the same time it firmly opposes the abuse of verification rights by any country, including the use of espionage or human intelligence, to infringe upon the sovereignty of China and impair its legitimate security interests in violation of universally recognized principles of international law

4 . In the present day world where huge nuclear arsenals and nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons still exist, the supreme national interests of China demand that it ensure the safety, reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear weapons before the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons is achieved

5. The Chinese Government and people are ready to continue to work together with governments and peoples of other countries for an early realization of the lofty goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons

Germany [up]

Declaration made upon signature

It is the understanding of the German Government that nothing in this Treaty shall ever be interpreted or applied in such a way as to prejudice or prevent research into and development of controlled thermonuclear fusion and its economic use

Holy See [up]

Declaration upon signature

The Holy See is convinced that in the sphere of nuclear weapons, the banning of tests and of the further development of these weapons, disarmament and non-proliferation are closely linked and must be achieved as quickly as possible under effective international controls

Furthermore, the Holy See understands that these are steps towards a general and total disarmament which the international community as a whole should accomplish without delay.

Declaration upon ratification

The Holy See, in ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996 and signed by the Holy See on 24 September of the same year, wishes to repeat what was said when it added its signature: "The Holy See is convinced that in the sphere of nuclear weapons, the banning of tests and of the further development of these weapons, disarmament and non-proliferation are closely linked and must be achieved as quickly as possible under effective international controls

In conformity with the nature and particular condition of Vatican City State , the Holy See, by this ratification, seeks to advance the genuine promotion of a culture of peace based upon the primacy of law and of respect for human life. At the beginning of the third millennium, the implementation of a system of comprehensive and complete disarmament, capable of fostering a climate of trust, cooperation and respect between all States, represents an indispensable aspect of the concrete realization of a culture of life and peace

In lending moral support to the CTBT through this solemn act of ratification, the Holy See encourages the whole International Community, which is aware of the various challenges standing in the way of nuclear disarmament, to intensify its efforts to ensure the implementation of the said Treaty.

Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2

Declarations upon signature

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Treaty does not meet nuclear disarmament criteria as originally intended. We had not perceived a CTBT only as non-proliferation instrument. The Treaty must have terminated fully and comprehensive further development of nuclear weapons. However, the Treaty bans explosions, thus limiting such development only in certain aspects, while leaving others avenues wide open. We see no other way for the CTBT to be meaningful, however, unless it is considered as a step towards a phased program for nuclear disarmament with specific time frames through negotiations on a consecutive series of subsequent treaties

2. On National Technical Means, based on the deliberation that took place on the issues in the relevant Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva , we interpret the text as according a complementary role to them and reiterate that they should be phased out with further development of the International Monitoring System. National Technical Means should not be interpreted to include information received from espionage and human intelligence

3. The inclusion of Israel in the MESA grouping constitutes a politically-motivated aberration from UN practice and is thus objectionable. We express our strong reservation on the matter and believe that it will impede the implementation of the Treaty, as the confrontation of the States in this regional group would make it tremendously difficult for the Executive Council to form. The Conference of the States Parties would eventually be compelled to find a way to redress this problem.