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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NAURU
Criminal Appeal No.12 of 1979
HIRAM
v
THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU
6th August,
1979.
Driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor - sentence - imprisonment other than
in an exceptional case - what is an exceptional
case.
Appeal against the sentences
of one month's imprisonment and two months' imprisonment imposed upon conviction
for two offences of
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. Evidence was given of the appellant's exceptional record
of
hard work and devotion to duty, as a senior officer of the Nauru Phosphate
Corporation, and of his exceptional family circumstances,
in particular the need
for him personally to look after one of his children who was blind. The
respondent did not oppose the
appeal.
Held:
This was an exceptional case in which sentences of imprisonment need not be
opposed. It was exceptional because the appellant's'
previous conduct went well
beyond being mere "previous good character", and his family circumstances were
most unusual, so that imprisonment
would have caused extreme
hardship.
Appeal allowed; both
sentences set aside and fines of $50 and $100 imposed in their
place.
B. Dowiyogo for the
appellant
P.A. Thorpe for the
respondent
Thompson
CJ:
This Court has made it known
in many cases that, because of the prevalence of offences of driving while
intoxicated and because of
the heavy toll of life and limb which has been the
result, deterrent sentences have to be imposed for such offences. That being so,
the sentences imposed by the magistrate were neither wrong in principle nor
harsh and excessive. Indeed only in an exceptional case
can the Courts properly
avoid imposing such a sentence for a second
offence.
This Court is asked to
decide that this is such an exceptional case. Mr. Thorpe, appearing; for the
Republic, has agreed with Mr.
Dowiyogo that it is. The relevant matters are the
quite exceptional record of hard work and devotion to duty, of which the
referees
speak; that goes far beyond mere “previous good character”.
Then there are the exceptional family circumstances of the
appellant and the
greater than usual hardship which will result to his family from the
imprisonment of the appellant. Mr. Thorpe
has accepted the factual accuracy of
these matters; so this Court should also do
so.
Taking these matters into
account and the support given by Mr. Thorpe to the plea for leniency made by Mr.
Dowiyogo and after some
considerable hesitation - I have come to the conclusion
that this is the sort of exceptional case in which it is proper for the Courts
not to impose a sentence of
imprisonment.
Accordingly the
appeals are both allowed. The sentences imposed for both offences are set aside.
In respect of the first offence the
appellant must pay a fine of $50 and, in
respect of the second offence a fine of
$100.
The District Court had no
discretion to do otherwise than to suspend the appellant’s driving licence
for a least six months;
nor has this Court. Nor does the Motor Traffic Act
1938-1972 give the Courts any power to limit suspension under section 21 (3)
(a).
In the past the District Court has assumed a power to do so where the
suspension is ordered under section 21 (3) (b). I am by no
means sure that it
has that power. In any case, in view of the senior position held by the
appellant, it would not be unreasonable
to expect the Nauru Phosphate
Corporation to provide a driver to drive him where he needs to go in the course
of his work. Accordingly,
no order will be made in respect of the suspension of
the appellant’s driving licence. The orders made by the District Court
will stand.
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/nr/cases/NRSC/1979/3.html