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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NAURU
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCE NO. 3 OF 1977
Four questions referred under Article 55 of the Constitution
27th September,
1977.
Supply
legislation - Article 61 of the Constitution - procedural requirements for
enactment of supply legislation under Article
61(4).
Supply
legislation - Articles 59(4) and 61 of the Constitution - whether supply
legislation can be enacted otherwise than under Article
61.
Article 59 of the Constitution
reads -
"59. (1) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Treasury Fund except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the Treasury Fund by this Constitution or in accordance with law.
(2) No moneys shall be withdrawn from any fund referred to in Article 58 other than the Treasury Fund except in accordance with law.
(3) A proposed law for the withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury Fund or any other fund referred to in Article 58 shall not receive the certificate of the Speaker under Article 47 unless the purpose of the withdrawal has been recommended to Parliament by the Cabinet.
(4) The Cabinet shall cause to be prepared and laid before Parliament before the date of commencement of each financial year (or if, in respect of a particular financial year, Parliament, by resolution, determines a later date, before that later date), estimates of the revenues and expenditure of Nauru for that year."
Article
61 reads -
"61 (1) If the appropriation law in respect of a financial year has not received the certificate of the Speaker under Article 47 on or before the twenty-first day before the commencement of that financial year, the Cabinet may, in accordance with clause (2) of this Article, recommend to Parliament a proposed law authorising the withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury Fund for the purpose of meeting expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Republic of Nauru after the commencement of that financial year until the expiration of three months or the coming into operation of the appropriation law, whichever is the earlier.
(2) A recommendation by the Cabinet referred to in clause (1) of this Article shall be in writing delivered to the Speaker not later than the fourteenth day before the commencement of the financial year and the Speaker shall, on receiving the recommendation, lay it before Parliament as soon as practicable.
(3) For the purposes of clause (2) of this Article and notwithstanding Article 40, the Speaker shall, if necessary, appoint a time for the beginning of a session, or for a sitting, of Parliament.
(4) Where the Cabinet has recommended a proposed law under clause (1) of this Article and neither the appropriation law nor that proposed law has come into operation on or before the commencement of that financial year, the Cabinet may authorise the withdrawal of moneys in accordance with that proposed law but the amount of moneys so withdrawn shall not exceed one-quarter of the amount withdrawn under the authority of the appropriation law or laws in respect of the preceding financial year."
On
9th June, 1977, a Bill for a Supply Act was presented to Parliament; it was read
three times and passed by Parliament on that date.
A written recommendation of
the Bill by the Cabinet was delivered to the Speaker but not laid before
Parliament by him. The Act provided
for supply from 1st July, 1977, until 1st
October, 1977, or until the appropriation law for the 1977-1978 financial year
came into
operation, whichever date might be the, earlier. The Minister for
Finance, introducing the Bill, said that it was "necessary to introduce
the Bill
as required by Article 61 of the Constitution". Estimates of revenue and
expenditure for 1977-1978 had been laid before
Parliament and a Bill for the
Appropriation Act 1977-1978 had been presented before the Bill for the Supply
Act was presented.
The validity of
the Supply Act was called into question and the Cabinet referred four questions
to the Supreme Court for its opinion
under Article 55 of the Constitution.
Those questions
were:
(1) On the facts, have the provisions of Article 61 of the Constitution been complied with in relation to the Supply Act 1977?
(2) If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, was the Cabinet nevertheless entitled to authorise withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury Fund in accordance with Article 61(4) of the Constitution?
(3) Was the Act entitled the Supply Act 1977 validly enacted?
(4) Is the Supply Act 1977 law?
Held:
(1) Article 61 of the Constitution sets the procedure which must be complied
with before the Cabinet can authorise the withdrawal
of moneys from the Treasury
Fund under clause (4) of that
Article.
(2) Although the
provision in Article 61 for the presentation to Parliament of a Bill for supply
for the first three months of a financial
year is the only provision in the
Constitution relating expressly to supply, it is a part of the procedure
provided as a prerequisite
to withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury Fund being
authorised under Article 61(4); it is not intended to exclude the presentation
of Bills for supply otherwise than in accordance with that Procedure, if their
presentation is otherwise expressly or implicitly
authorised by the
Constitution.
(3) Although Article
59(4) implicitly requires that the principal of annuality be observed in the
Republic's finances and accounting,
it does not preclude the enactment of supply
legislation.
(4) Bills for supply
legislation may be presented to Parliament and enacted by Parliament, provided
that their effect is not to destroy
or seriously impair the principle of
annuality in the Republic's finances and
accounting.
S.E.K. Hulme for the
Cabinet
C.G. Powles for Hammer
DeRoburt, M.P. and other M.P.s
Hon. V.
Eoaeo, M.P. in
person
Thompson,
CJ.:
The following questions have
been referred under Article 55 of the Constitution for the opinion of this Court
–
(1) On the facts, have the provisions of Article 61 of the Constitution been complied with in relation to the Supply Act 1977?
(2) If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, was the Cabinet nevertheless entitled to authorise withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury Fund in accordance with Article 61(4) of the Constitution?
(3) Was the Act entitled the Supply Act 1977 validly enacted?
(4) Is the Supply Act 1977 law?
These
questions have been referred in the context of certain facts. Those facts may be
summarised as follows:-
(1) A Bill for an Act citable as the Supply Act 1977 was presented to Parliament by the Minister for Finance on 9th June, 1977, and was read three times and passed by Parliament on that date. It was then certified by the Speaker as having been passed by Parliament.
(2) A written recommendation of the Bill by the Cabinet dated 9th June, 1977, was delivered to the Speaker but not laid before Parliament by him. The Bill was orally recommended to Parliament by the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Cabinet.
(3) The Bill contained provision for the withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury Fund for the purpose of meeting expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Republic from 1st July, 1977; it provided for the Supply Act 1977 to cease to have effect on 1st October, 1977 or upon the coming into operation of the appropriation law for the 1977-1978 financial year, whichever date was the earlier.
(4) In the Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill it was implied that he Bill was being presented pursuant to Article 61 of the Constitution. The Minister for Finance, in presenting the Bill, made a statement that it was "necessary to introduce the Bill as required by Article 61 of the Constitution".
(5) Before the Bill was presented to Parliament the Cabinet had laid before Parliament estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 1977-1978 and had presented to Parliament the Bill for the Appropriation Act 1977-1978. Those estimates have not yet been approved and that Bill has not yet been passed.
Written
submissions were received by this Court from Mr. C.G. Powles, as counsel
representing eight Members of Parliament, Mr. S.E.K.
Hulme, as counsel
representing the Cabinet, and the Honourable V. Eoaeo, M.P. All three of them
subsequently addressed the Court
orally and an oral submission was received also
from the Honourable JA. Bop,
M.P.
QUESTION
NO. 1
Article 61 of the
Constitution is as follows-
"61. (1) If the appropriation law in respect of a financial year has not received the certificate of the Speaker under Article 47 on or before the twenty-first day before the commencement of that financial year, the Cabinet may, in accordance with clause (2) of this Article, recommend to Parliament a proposed law authorising the withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury Fund for the purpose of meeting expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Republic of Nauru after the commencement of that financial year until the expiration of three months or the coming into operation of the appropriation law, whichever is the earlier.
(2) A recommendation by the Cabinet referred to in clause (1) of this Article shall be in writing delivered to the Speaker of later than the fourteenth day before the commencement of the financial year and the Speaker shall, on receiving the recommendation, lay it before Parliament as soon as practicable.
(3) For the purpose of clause (2) of this Article and notwithstanding Article 40, the Speaker shall, if necessary, appoint a time for the beginning of a session, or for a sitting, of Parliament.
(4) Where the Cabinet has recommended a proposed law, under clause (1) of this Article and neither the appropriation law nor that proposed law has come into operation on or before the commencement of that financial year, the Cabinet may authorise the withdrawal of moneys in accordance with that proposed law but the amount of moneys so withdrawn shall not exceed one-quarter of the amount withdrawn under the authority of the appropriation law or laws in respect of the preceding financial year."
The
marginal note to the Article reads "Withdrawal of moneys in advance of
appropriation law".
For the
presentation of a proposed law to Parliament to comply with Article 61, the
recommendation of it by the Cabinet must -
(a) be made after 10th June;
(b) be made in writing;
(c) be delivered to he Speaker by not later than 17th June; and
(d) be laid before Parliament by the Speaker.
Quite
clearly the recommendation must be made, and laid before Parliament, before or
contemporaneously with the presentation of the
proposed law to
Parliament.
A Bill for an Act is
proposed legislation. The presentation of the Supply Bi11 1977 clearly did not
comply with Article 61 in two
respects. First, it was presented to Parliament
(and indeed passed) two days before it could properly be recommended. Second,
the
recommendation, although made by the Cabinet in writing to the Speaker, was
not laid before Parliament by the
Speaker.
Mr. Powles submitted that
the Bill did not comply with the provisions of Article 6l for a third reason,
namely that moneys were sought
for one day in excess of the three months
referred to in Article 61(1). Whether that submission is correct or not depends
upon the
effect of the words "shall cease to have effect on" in clause 2 of the
Bill. It is not necessary in the circumstances of this case
for this Court to
express any opinion on the
point.
Mr. Eoaeo submitted that
the Bill did not comply with Article 61 because no proposed appropriation law
for the 1977-1978 financial
year had been properly recommended to Parliament. In
doing so he relied on facts not included in the reference. The questions
referred
can be answered only on the basis of the facts stated in the reference.
It is therefore, not possible to consider that
submission.
Because of the two
respects referred to above in which the Bill did not comply with the
requirements of Article 61, this Court will
have to answer "No" to Question No.
1. Before it does so, however, it should be made clear that the Cabinet does not
seek to rely
on such compliance as the basis of the validity of the Supply Act
1977. Further, it should be noted that failure to comply with a
procedure
prescribed by statute as preliminary to any transaction does not necessarily
invalidate the transaction. In some cases
the transaction may be valid if there
has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements, even though there
has not been
strict compliance with them. In others the statutory provision may
be regarded as directory rather than mandatory. In each case it
is necessary to
consider the nature of the statutory provision and the extent and effect of the
non-compliance before it can be ascertained
whether the transaction is valid of
invalid. This is well illustrated by the different judgments, and the reasoning
adopted in each
of them, in the case of
Victoria v.
The
Commonwealth of
Australia (1976) 50 A.L.J.R. 7, a case in
the High Court of
Australia.
Question No. 1 is
answered as follows -
It is the
opinion of his Court that the procedure followed preliminary to the presentation
of the Bill for the Supply Act 1977 to
Parliament did not comply with the
provisions of Article 61 of the
Constitution.
QUESTION
NO. 2
The Court will deal with
this question after it has considered Question No.
3.
QUESTION No.
3
The Speaker has certified that
the Supply Act 1977 was enacted by Parliament. The Bill was presented to
Parliament in the proper form
for a proposed law, was recommended to Parliament
by the Cabinet, was read three times and was passed through all stages by a
majority
vote of Parliament. Prima facie, therefore, it was validly enacted.
However, its validity is called in question on three grounds.
The first is that
supply legislation cannot be validly enacted except in accordance with Article
61 of the constitution. The second
is that, even if supply legislation can be
enacted otherwise than in pursuance of, and in accordance with, Article 61, the
Bill for
the Supply Act 1977 could not be so enacted because Parliament was
informed that it was being presented under Article 61. The third
ground is that
the Bill could not be validly enacted by Parliament passing all three stages of
the Bill on the same day.
In his
written submission Mr. Powles has stated:
"Once Cabinet elected to recommend the proposed law in accordance with Article 61 and purported to introduce it to Parliament pursuant to that Article, the recommendation and proposed law were required to comply with the provisions of that Article".
That
statement may possibly reflect the Cabinet's political obligation but I am
unable to accept it as a correct statement of the
1aw. This Court has no
jurisdiction to inquire into the workings of Parliament to see whether members
have been misled over any matter.
The Constitution gives it no such
jurisdiction; nor can jurisdiction be inferred from the principles underlying
the Constitution
or the system of interrelating checks and balances between the
three arms of the State, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary,
implicit in the Constitution. It may be politically reprehensible to mislead
Parliament as to the circumstances in which legislation
is presented (whether or
not it is reprehensible in any particular case and if so, how reprehensible no
doubt depends on whether
Parliament is misled deliberately or accidentally) but
that is a matter for Parliament, and ultimately the electors, not for this
Court. This Court can express an opinion only upon the legal validity or
invalidity of the Supply Act
1977.
Mr. Powles has not, I think,
expressly submitted that the Act is invalid because the Bill passed through all
three readings on the
same day but he has called the restriction on debate
"improper"; such a submission can have relevance to these proceedings only so
far as such "impropriety" leads to legal invalidity. The normal practice in the
House of Commons in the United Kingdom is for the
three readings of money bills
to be taken on different days, apparently in order to ensure that there is ample
opportunity for members
to consider the contents of the bills and to debate
them. But that practice has been departed from on a number of occasions, once
as
recently as 1974. Parliamentary practice in respect of money bills is
essentially a matter for Parliament; Parliament is free
to regulate its
procedures. The public may well be concerned if Parliament habitually adopts
procedures which enable money bills
to be "bulldozed" through without adequate
time for consideration of their contents or for debate. But that is a political
matter,
for members of Parliament, and ultimately the electors. It does not
affect the legal validity of the
legislation.
Apart from his
arguments with which I have just dealt, Mr. Powles' submissions are based on one
fundamental premise, that supply legislation,
that is to say a Bill to provide
for the withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury Fund to meet expenditure in any
financial year until
the appropriation law for that financial year has become
law, can be presented to parliament only in accordance with Article
61.
If, as Mr. Hulme has
contended, the Cabinet has an option whether or not to use the Article 61
procedure for supply legislation, Mr.
Powles submissions must
fail.
Broadly, Mr. Powles has
based on two alternative or complementary grounds his argument that a bill for a
supply Act can be presented
to Parliament only in accordance with Article 61.
First, he has submitted that, although there is no express prohibition of supply
legislation which does not comply with Article 61, that Article and Article 59
when read together impose a system of annuality on
the management of the
Republic's finances, that in respect of each financial year they permit only an
appropriation Act, or several
appropriation Acts, and one, but only one, Supply
Act, and that that Supply Act must be for a period of three months and comply as
to content and presentation with the requirements of Article 61. Second, he has
submitted that, if Articles 59 and 61 do not prohibit
Supply Acts which do not
comply with Article 61, a constitutional convention that they must comply with
it has been established by
practice over the nine years since
independence.
In support of his
arguments to establish the first of those grounds Mr. Powles tendered a copy of
the report of two days (in January
1968) of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention, the elected body of Nauruans which enacted the
Constitution. The report
was admitted as evidence provisionally; that is to say,
the Court reserved its final decision whether to admit it. Having read all
the
relevant passages in the report, I find that it affords an excellent
illustration of the reason why generally the Courts will
not admit as evidence
reports of parliamentary debates on proposed legislation. The contents and the
purpose of Article 61 were discussed
by so many members of the Convention, and
so many different views were expressed, that no clear picture emerges of what
purpose the
Convention as a whole intended it to serve. Even the advisers were
not wholly consistent in the explanations which they gave from
time. The record
of the Convention will, therefore, not be taken into account by this Court for
the purpose of these
proceeding.
Article 59 of the
Constitution contains provisions relating to the withdrawal of moneys from the
Treasury Fund. It is as follows:
"59. (1) No moneys shall be withdrawn form the Treasury Fund except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the Treasury Fund by this Constitution or in accordance with law.
(2) No moneys shall be withdrawn from any fund referred to in Article 58 other than Treasury Fund except in accordance with law.
(3) A proposed law for the withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury Fund or any other fund referred to in Article 58 shall not receive the certificate of the Speaker under Article 47 unless the purpose of the withdrawal has been recommended to Parliament by the Cabinet.
(4) The Cabinet shall cause to be prepared and laid before Parliament before the date of commencement of each financial year (or if, in respect of a particular financial year, Parliament, by resolution, determines a later date, before that later date), estimates of the revenues and expenditure of Nauru for that year."
There
is no express provision that there must be an "appropriation law" for any
financial year; but it is to be implied from Article
59(4) and is assumed in
Article 61 that there will be an appropriation law in respect of each financial
year. The expression "appropriation
law" is not defined in the Constitution. It
is apparent from the context, however, that it means an Act of Parliament
appropriating
moneys in the Treasury Fund for specific purposes for which those
moneys have been voted to the executive by
Parliament.
In the United Kingdom,
and in many other countries which have derived their political systems from the
United Kingdom, the executive
cannot spend public moneys unless authorised to do
so by Parliament. In order to satisfy Parliament that moneys which the executive
seeks parliamentary authority to spend are properly required, the executive
prepares and lays before Parliament estimates of expenditure;
these comprise a
statement of the purposes for which the moneys are required and the amount
required for each
purpose.
Parliament then considers
the requirements (other than any for which expenditure is already authorised by
any law), vote-head by vote-head,
and, having by resolution voted the required
moneys to the executive, enacts legislation appropriating the various amounts to
the
various vote-heads. In this way Parliament exercises control over the
purposes for which money is spent by the executive. Parliamentary
control is
further exercised in many countries by the adoption of a system of annual
budgeting, accounting and accountability. Estimates
of expenditure are prepared
and moneys appropriated on an annual basis, although usually the estimates are
revised, or supplementary
estimates laid before Parliament, and further public
moneys are voted and appropriated by law for particular purposes during the
financial year. In the United Kingdom and many other countries, because the
voting of moneys sought in the annual estimates takes
several months and the
appropriation law in respect of that authorised expenditure is not passed until
well into the financial year,
some moneys have to be voted and appropriated
before the start of the financial year so that the executive can keep the
services
of the state running until the moneys for the full year are voted and
appropriated. In the United Kingdom the procedure followed
is for special
estimates of moneys needed to carry on the services of the state for about five
months to be laid before Parliament;
the amounts sought by the executive are
then voted by resolution (called "votes on account") and Consolidated Fund Act
is enacted
appropriating the moneys
voted.
Article 59 of the
Constitution of Nauru, read in conjunction with Part IV, clearly provides for
Parliamentary control of the provision
of public moneys to the executive for
expenditure on the services of the Republic. Moneys cannot be withdrawn from the
Treasury Fund
(other than for expenditure charged on the Treasury Fund by the
Constitution) unless authorised by Act of Parliament. Furthermore,
in order that
Parliament may be aware of the purposes for which the Cabinet requires to be
authorised to spend moneys in each financial
year, estimates of such expenditure
have to be laid before Parliament. Normally this has to be done before the start
of the financial
year but Parliament may agree to a later date. Implicit in this
provision is a system of annual financial accounting and accountability.
Thus
the system of annuality, which in the United Kingdom is based on a
constitutional convention, is a part of the constitutional
framework of Nauru.
[It is necessary that Parliament should exercise its powers within that
framework]
What is the effect of
this on the apparently unlimited power of Parliament under Part IV of the
Constitution to authorise the cabinet
to withdraw moneys from the Treasury Fund
at any time and for any period, if a proposed law for the purpose is recommended
to it
by the Cabinet? In my view, Parliament must accept that its power is
circumscribed. Legislation intended to frustrate, or having
the effect of
frustrating, the system of annual accounting should not be enacted. The
appropriation law for a financial year should
be related to the annual estimates
of expenditure for that financial year, i.e. the estimates laid before
Parliament under Article
59 (4), as eventually approved by Parliament and
authority given by Parliament during the course of the financial year to incur
additional
expenditure should be reflected in an approved revision of those
estimates or in approved supplementary estimates for that financial
year.
Otherwise, the basis of accounting – and, more important, of the cabinet's
accountability – for expenditure would
be removed. Whether and if so, to
what extent, those obligations of Parliament are enforceable by this Court, e.g.
by declaration
that legislation enacted in breach of them is invalid, or only by
the electorate by its votes is a question which is not necessary
to decide in
these proceedings.
In these
present proceedings this Court is concerned only with the question whether the
enactment of the Supply Act 1977 was a breach
of Parliament's obligation to keep
within the constitutional framework of annuality. The maximum period for which
the Act provides
moneys is only three months. In the United Kingdom such Acts
are without time limit and the moneys provided are usually sufficient
for a
period of four or five months. The do not frustrate the "annuality" system in
the United Kingdom. No reason is apparent why
an Act such as the Supply Act 1977
should be regarded as likely to do so in Nauru. The fact that it is for a fixed
period is irrelevant
in this regard, because it is overtaken by the
appropriation Act and the expenditure which it authorises is included in that
Act.
The protection of the
"annuality" system does not require that proposed supply legislation should be
presented only in accordance
with Article 61. Article 61 does not itself
expressly or by necessary implication require it. Its strict requirements as to
time
and manner of presentation are appropriate to a procedure leading to the
cabinet having a power to withdraw moneys from the Treasury
Fund for a period of
up to three months without express parliamentary approval; they appear
unnecessarily restrictive in respect
of procedure resulting simply in Parliament
having the opportunity to enact supply legislation. In the opinion of this Court
Articles
59 and 61 do not require that supply legislation be limited to one Act
providing moneys for a maximum period of three months only
and presented in
pursuance of, and in accordance with, Article
61.
With regard to the second
ground on which Mr. Powles based his argument that a bill for a supply Act can
be presented to Parliament
only in accordance with Article 61, that is to say
that a constitutional convention has been established by a practice followed
over
the nine years since Independence, it is to be noted that the practice was
not followed in 1972. Further, it is a practice which
is as consonant with a
decision of the Cabinet to adopt the Article 61 procedure so as to be able, if
necessary, to take advantage
of the provisions of Article 61 (4), as it is with
a decision to limit supply legislation to periods of three months. Mr. Bop, the
former Minister for Finance, has informed this Court that he believed at all
times over the period of nine years that the Supply
Act had to be for a period
of three months. A misunderstanding of what the Constitution requires is hardly
a sound basis for the
establishment of a Constitutional convention. In the
opinion of this Court, therefore, no constitutional convention has been
established
that there must be only one Supply Act in respect of each financial
year or that it must be for a period of three
months.
Before answering Question
No. 3, I think it desirable draw attention to a practice followed in the United
Kingdom in relation to the
content of supply legislation. If not essential to
the system of annuality, it is closely related to it. The practice is that no
provision may be included for expenditure on services not already sanctioned by
Parliament in the appropriation law for the previous
financial year or in
legislation specifically authorising expenditure on those services. That
practice appears to have been followed
in Nauru up to date and it is possible
that the phrase "expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Republic
of Nauru",
which appears in Article 61, should be construed as requiring that it
be followed. I express no concluded opinion on that point,
as it is not in issue
in these proceedings.
Question No.
3 is answered as follows:
In the
opinion of this Court the Act entitled the Supply Act 1977 was validly
enacted.
QUESTION
NO. 4
In view of the answer given
to Question No. 3, Question No. 4 is answered as follows
-
In the opinion of this Court the
supply Act 1977 is
law.
QUESTION
NO. 2
Question No. 2 is now
answered as follows -
As the
Supply Act 1977 is law, the Cabinet has no need to, and is not entitled to,
authorise withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury
Fund in accordance with Article
61(4) of the Constitution.
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