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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NAURU
Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 1972
DEATAG DARAGOUW
v
THE REPUBLIC
11th September,
1972.
Plea -
accused not legally represented - Court need-not warn of possible custodial
sentence before accepting plea of
guilty.
Appeal against sentence of
4 months' imprisonment with hard labour for driving a motor vehicle whilst under
the influence intoxicating
liquor. The appellant was not legally represented. He
pleaded guilty and admitted the facts constituting the offence as stated by
the
prosecutor. The District Court accepted his plea of guilty without warning him
that upon conviction a custodial sentence might
be
imposed.
Held:
Generally there is no obligation on a magistrate, before accepting a plea of
guilty, to warn the accused that a custodial sentence
may be
imposed.
B. Dowiyogo for the
appellant
D. Gioura for the
respondent
Thompson
CJ:
The appellant was charged in
the District Court with driving a motor vehicle whilst under the influence of
liquor. He pleaded guilty
and was convicted. He was sentenced to serve 4 months'
imprisonment with hard labour and his driving licence was suspended for 6
months.
He has appealed against
the severity of the sentence. Mr. Dowiyogo, who has represented him at the
hearing of this appeal but did
not represent him in the District Court, sought,
and was granted by this Court, leave to appeal also against the conviction on
the
grounds that the-plea was not properly taken and that the facts stated by
the prosecuting officer in the District Court did not establish
the
offence.
It is apparent from the
record that the appellant pleaded after the charge had been read to him in
Nauruan and that the prosecuting
officer then stated to the Court the facts
which were alleged to constitute the offence. There is no record that the
appellant was
asked whether he agreed with those facts. The magistrate should
have ascertained that and recorded the appellant's agreement, disagreement
or
qualification of the facts before proceeding to convict him. If the appellant
had denied the facts, a plea of 'not guilty' should
have been recorded, unless
he admitted other facts establishing the
offence.
However, Mr. Dowiyogo has
not alleged that the facts stated by the prosecuting officer in the District
Court were not correct. In
those circumstances the failure of the magistrate to
ascertain that the appellant agreed that they were correct has not resulted
in
any injustice. Magistrates should, however, take care to follow the proper
procedure as an irregularity of this nature is serious
and, if there is any
reasonable possibility that it may have resulted in injustice, the conviction
will have to be set aside on
appeal.
In the present case,
however, Mr. Dowiyogo has based his appeal on two different grounds. First, he
says that the facts stated by
the prosecuting officer do not constitute the
offence charged. Although there is no specific statement that the doctor found
that
the appellant was under the influence of liquor, it is quite clear that he
did so find. The words used in the statement were: 'He
was examined by Dr. Bill
and admitted he had consumed liquor. His ability to drive was impaired'.
Doubtless, if there had been a
plea of 'not guilty' and Dr. Bill had given
evidence, he would have stated the details of his examination and the reasons
for considering
that the appellant's ability to drive was impaired. But, as a
summary of the facts consequent upon the plea of 'guilty' the words
used by the
prosecuting officer are quite adequate to show that Dr. Bill found that the
appellant was under the influence of liquor.
He had been driving a motor car and
had driven it into a tree shortly before. The statement adequately sets out
facts sufficient
to establish the offence.
Mr. Dowiyogo's second ground
of appeal-against the recording of the plea of guilty is that it was contrary to
natural justice for
the Court to accept a plea of guilty from an accused person
not represented by counsel or a pleader in a case in which a sentence
of
imprisonment might be imposed, without warning him of that possible consequence
of his plea. Undoubtedly every Court has a duty
to ensure that the procedure
which it follows will not unfairly prejudice the accused. There may be cases in
which, because of their
unusual nature, the accused person may not realise the
possible consequences of conviction and in which the Court should therefore
explain those possible consequences before taking the plea But basically what is
required in the normal case is that the Court should
be sure that the accused
person understands the charge, that he makes his plea in the free exercise of
his own choice whether to
admit having committed the offence or to deny it, and
that the plea is not accepted as a plea of 'guilty' unless it is
unequivocal.
Driving offences are
very common in Nauru, as are convictions of such offences. The population is
small and society close-knit. Most
people own or drive cars and are well aware
of the effect of the laws relating to driving. I cannot, therefore, conceive of
any case
in which a person charged with one of the common driving offences would
suffer any injustice by not being informed of the possible
consequences of
conviction before his plea were taken. In the present case there was certainly
no injustice. The appellant was convicted
last year on a similar charge and
sentenced to imprisonment and his driving licence was suspended. He was,
therefore, well aware
from his own experience what the possible consequences
were if he were convicted.
The
appellant has appealed against the sentence on the ground that it is harsh and
excessive. In view of his recent previous conviction
for a similar offence, the
prevalence of this offence and the serious consequences of bad driving and
offences of this nature in
Nauru over' the past 18 months (4 persons killed and
127 injured in a population of less than eight thousand) the sentence, which
was
clearly intended by the magistrate to be a deterrent, cannot be regarded as
harsh, excessive or wrong in
principle.
The appeals against
conviction and sentence are dismissed.
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