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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NAURU
Land Appeal No. 10 of 1971
IKIRIR
v.
DUBURIYA AND OTHERS
5th January,
1972.
Estate
of Nauruan dying intestate - Administration Order No. 3 of 1938 - meeting of
family - meaning of "family" - widow a member
of the
family.
E.,
a Nauruan woman, died intestate some time before the Second World War. She left
surviving her five children, including D. D. died
during the Second World War.
The appellant, I., is the widow of D. E.'s estate comprised a number of portions
of land. The Nauru
Lands Committee decided many years ago who should inherit
such of those portions as had already been identified and found to belong
to E.
In 1971 the Committee identified another of the portions, Atagadeto, and found
that it had belonged to E. It then called a
meeting of members of E.'s family,
i.e. her four surviving children in accordance with the provisions of
Administration Order No.
3 of 1938, in order to see if they could agree on who
should inherit that portion. They agreed to share it equally among themselves.
I. appealed on the ground that as D.'s widow she should have been included as a
member of the family and that the agreement reached
in her absence was
invalid.
Held: (1) Although the
ownership of the land by E. and its extent could not be finally decided at the
time of E.'s death, the persons
entitled to inherit from her any right she might
have in it should have been decided at that
time.
(2) Although "family" is
used in Administration Order No. 3 of 1938 apparently with different meanings in
different contexts, for
the purpose of the provisions relating to the holding of
a meeting of the family to see if agreement can be reached as to distribution
of
the estate of the deceased it includes the widow or widower of the
deceased.
(3) If the family
meeting had been held at the proper time, D. would have been alive and able to
attend. If, as was likely he had
obtained a share in the land, I. as his widow
would have been entitled to attend the family meeting in respect of his estate
and,
in default of agreement being reached at that meeting, to have a life
interest in a share of his estate. She was, therefore, entitled
to attend the
family meeting in respect of E.'s estate in place of
D.
Appeal
allowed
K.R. Adeang for
appellant
B. Dowiyago for
respondent
Thompson
C.J.:
This appeal relates to
portion No. 30 phosphate land, named 'Atagadeto' in Anetan District. By a
determination published in Gazette
No. 39 of 1971 the Nauru Lands Committee
decided that the portion belongs to the respondents and that the appellant has
no share
in it.
Land called
'Atagadeto' belonged to Eimwaeong who died before the Second World War. She left
a number of children surviving her; one
of them was Dengait, the husband of the
appellant. The respondents are all children of Eimwaeong, except for Akiwib who
is a grandchild.
Dengait died during the Second World War, i.e. several years
after the death of
Eimwaeong.
Although land called
Atagadeto is shown in the Land Registration Book of 1928 as belonging to
Eimwaeong, it was identified and surveyed
only this year. (Indeed, the
identification was disputed and is the subject of Land Appeals Nos. 11, 15 and
16 of 1971 which are
also before this Court during these sessions). It is not
disputed that before this year the question of who should inherit the land
from
Eimwaeong had not been decided by the Nauru Lands Committee, although the
inheritance of some at least, of her other land was
decided a long time
ago.
When the land had been
identified, therefore, the Committee still had to determine the inheritance. In
order to do so they applied
the provisions of Administration Order No. 3 of 1938
and called a meeting of the family of Eimwaeong. The appellant was not invited
to attend. The respondents agreed to the land being distributed among themselves
and the Committee determined its ownership accordingly.
Mr. Adeang, who
represents the appellant in these proceedings, has submitted that the appellant
should have been invited to attend
the meeting as a member of the family and
that, as she was not invited and did not attend, there was no proper agreement
by the family.
Administration
Order No. 3 of 1938 is an unfortunate example of a layman's drafting of
legislation in respect of a matter requiring
considerable drafting skill.
Paragraph 3 reads as follows:-
"(3) If the family is unable to agree, the following procedure shall be followed:-
(a) In the case of an unmarried person the property to be returned to the people from whom it was received, or if they are dead, to the nearest relatives in the same tribe.
(b) Married - No issue, - the property to be returned to the family or nearest relatives of the deceased. The widower or widow to have the use of the land during his or her lifetime if required by him or her.
(c) Married - with children - the land to be divided equally between the children, and the surviving parent to have the right to use the land during his or her lifetime. When an estate comprises only a small area of land the eldest daughter to receive the whole estate and other children have the right to use the land during their lifetime."
The
word 'family' is used without a definition and it is apparently distinguished in
paragraph (3) from both 'nearest relatives' and
'widow'. But, if it is to be
distinguished from nearest relative what meaning can it be given? It might be
argued that 'nearest relatives'
means persons outside the immediate family but
the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph (3) preclude this; those
provisions
have effect only if there is a 'family' which has not been able to
reach agreement and it is inconceivable that persons outside the
immediate
family would take before members of the immediate family. Prior to 1938, it was
apparently not uncommon for wives to inherit
their husband's land. In some
families the wives played a dominant role. I find it hard to believe that they
were not included in
the family meetings which originally the Chiefs and then
the Lands Committee held in order to determine to whom deceased estates
should
pass.
There is a further reason,
within Administration Order No. 3 of 1938 itself, for thinking that the person
who drafted that order intended
the widow to be included in the term 'family'.
If she was not, the family would comprise only the blood relatives of the
deceased
and they could always prevent her obtaining a life interest in the
estate by agreeing among themselves to exclude her. Would they
ever in such
circumstances fail to agree among themselves and so let her into a life interest
under paragraph (3)(b)? The very existence
of that sub-paragraph, however,
presupposes such a possibility.
I
am satisfied, therefore, that generally the widow of the deceased must be
included as a member of the family for the purpose of
the meeting held to try to
reach agreement as to the distribution of her late husband's estate. In the
present case, however, the
position is more complicated. If the meeting of the
family to try to agree on the inheritance of the land 'Atagadeto' had been held
when it should have been held, i.e. immediately after Eimwaeong's death as part
of a general meeting to determine the inheritance
of all the property real and
personal comprising her estate, the appellant's husband, Dengait, would have
been entitled to attend;
if he had not reached agreement with the others
entitled to attend, the land 'Atagadeto' would have been shared between
Eimwaeong's
children, including himself. If a share of the land had passed to
him, the appellant would have been entitled on his death to take
part in the
family meeting held to determine who should inherit it and, if no agreement had
been reached, she would have had a life
interest in the whole of Dengait's share
of it.
It would be anomalous and
unjust if, because the inheritance of the estate of Eimwaeong was not decided
when it should have been but
only 30 years later, the appellant were to have no
standing at all in the matter. In order for justice to be done she should, as
the person entitled in default of agreement to the contrary to take a life
interest in Dengait's estate, have been afforded an opportunity
to take
Dengait's place at the meeting of the family even though she was not herself a
member of Eimwaeong's family. This doubtless
is an extension of the normal
concept of the family but it is necessary if injustice is to be avoided in cases
where, through a failure
on the part of the Nauru Lands Committee or its
predecessor to take the proper action at the correct time, a member of the
family
who should have been heard as to the inheritance has died without issue
but leaving a widow or
widower.
Since it is clear from
the evidence of the respondent, Akibwib, that, if a meeting were held now, the
other members of the family
would not agree to the appellant's taking more than
a life interest in the share of the land which would have been Dengait's and
she
would not agree to less, it would be pointless to return this matter to the
Nauru Lands Committee for a meeting to be held. I
shall order that the land be
shared on the basis that there was no agreement and as though the distribution
had taken place when
it should have, i.e. immediately after Eimwaeong's
death.
Insofar as the
determination relating to portion No. 30 published in Gazette No. 39 of 1971 is
a determination of the persons who
are to inherit Eimwaeong's interest in
phosphate land called 'Atagadeto' in Anetan District, the determination is
varied so as to
read:
Duburiya 1/5
Eduar 1/5
Epangatsi 1/5
Akibwib 1/5
Ikirir 1/5 (LTO)
The
decision of this appeal does not relate to the identification of the land or its
size. Whether Portion No. 30 is the land 'Atagadeto'
which belonged to Eimwaeong
and whether its boundaries are correct is a matter dealt with in Land Appeals
Nos. 11, 15 and 16 of 1971.
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