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Corruption and Legal Pluralism

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'Legal Pluralism' is not a concept that I have used in my research on corruption, but I'm roughly familiar with some of the issues it raises from earlier work on customary land tenure and Pacific Islands constitutions. In a 2005 book called *Foreign Flowers* I analysed and compared the historical processes by which plural institutional orders grew up in the Pacific. I asked why some of them seem to stick, and some were rejected. There I looked particularly at the transfer of constitutions, democracy, land registration, public sector reform and anti corruption schemes.

However, having just read Miranda Forsyth's very impressive 2009 book *A Bird that Flies with Two Wings: Kastom and state justice systems in Vanuatu* I have been excited about ways her approach might open up questions I have been worrying about in relation to corruption. Here I have relied on her account of legal pluralism (as opposed to legal positivism, and legal anthropology). I teach in a Public Policy department so I am also interested in the practical approach she takes towards the end of the book

I have been interested in corruption since the late 1990s (Larmour 1997), initially through teaching a course on it, and later in research on Transparency International, the anti-corruption NGO (De Sousa, Larmour and Hindess 2009). Over the years have come to feel that the urgent need to 'do something' about corruption had deferred and displaced consideration of what corruption meant and the why and how different people conceptualised it and dealt with it. In a book called *Interpreting Corruption* (Larmour in press) I adopted an approach to corruption which, in the study of Public Policy, is defined as:

> Word based methods and writing, researcher reflexivity, and the exploration of multiple meanings and their ambiguities, especially in policy contexts in which contention over the policy issue under study is common (Yanow 2007: 406)

I have also tried to be cross-disciplinary – not only within social sciences (including economics which has been influential in the revival of interest in corruption) but also to drawing on literature and poetry. I grounded all this in a reanalysis of Transparency International's studies of National Integrity Systems in the Pacific Islands (to which Anita Jowitt and Tess Newton Cain were distinguished contributors). They focussed on the anti corruption architecture: what countries were doing about corruption. I tried to

look through that architecture too the phenomenon itself – what counted as corruption, what people thought caused it and so on.

I was also influenced by what I have called ‘anti-anti-corruption’: scholarship emanating from US and Eastern Europe that says, roughly, corruption is a bad thing, but anti corruption campaigns and institutions are not always and everywhere good things (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1988, Kotkin and Sajo 2002, Krastev 2004, Andersson, S. and P. Heywood, 2009). They have their own reasons and defects. This led me to follow the cleanup up campaign and the use of anti corruption law by the regime against its enemies in Fiji since the 2006 coup (Larmour 2008, 2010).

In *Foreign Flowers* law was the most promiscuous means of policy transfer. Jusrisdictions regularly borrowed from each other, just changing the names of the country (I remember ‘Tanzania’ mysteriously appearing as the object of regulation in some Solomon Islands draft legislation at independence). And – against the nationalist emphasis on rejection and autochthony – the sociology of law found local people willing adopters of foreign models if they suited local purposes (Beckstrom 1973, quoted in Larmour 2005: 35). But law is not my central focus in the corruption book. My focus is corruption (the perceived problem) rather than law (one of the responses to it, which I felt were getting plenty of attention). I found the law was only one of many types of ‘talk’ (or discourse) on corruption in the region. Rather than legal pluralism, there was a plurality of discourses. These types of talk and the settings in which they take place are listed in Table1.

Table 1

Types of Talk about Corruption

Type of Talk	Style of talk	Settings
Internal	'To oneself', permitting, inhibiting, calculating	Anticipated and internalised
Popular	Gossip, information, practical advice, warnings	Family, friends, workplace, letters to the editor, blogs
Humorous	Joking, satirizing, critical	Parties, shows, carnivals, newspaper cartoons
Literary	Internal, emotional, reflective	Publication and performance
Legal	Prohibitions, definitions, interpretations, appeals	Legislation, cases, legal judgements, codes
Religious	Inspiring, consoling, guiding, condemning	Churches, mosques, committees Social movements
Media	Sensational, investigative, informative, crusading, scandalous	Newspaper editorials, TV and radio news
Policy	Assessment, solutions, evaluations, options, recommendations	Plans, reports, statements, audits, contracts, consultancies
Academic	Theory, analysis, explanation	Academic disciplines, research projects, theses, think tanks, autonomous universities

Source: Larmour in press

When I came to analyse this 'legal' talk I found that all of 14 countries surveyed by TI were so-called 'common law' jurisdictions. They adopted English case law at independence (the three formerly US territories adopting it via the US). Some also provided that their courts make take customary law into account, in varying degrees (Powles 1988). There is a common law offence of bribery, defined in a 1914 UK case, 'when a bribe is given or offered to induce a public official to fail to act in accordance with his duty'[1]. 'Public official' is defined broadly to include someone carrying out a public duty like a coroner or member of the armed forces (ibid). Bribing electors is also a common law offence.

Most of the island countries surveyed also deal with bribery in their criminal codes. Fiji's lists offences such as 'abuse of office' under the heading 'official corruption'. Tonga's Criminal Offices Act deals with bribery of government servants, and extortion fraudulent conversion and false receipts by officials. It uses the adverb 'corruptly' to describe the acceptance of them by judges, politicians or officials Ingram 2004: 11). Solomon Islands

[1] Crown Prosecution Service cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/bribery and_corruption, accessed 28 May 2009

penal code refers to 'official corruption' and also uses the word as an adverb, as in 'corruptly gives, confers, or procures or promises' (Section 91). Tuvalu and Niue's legislation also uses corruptly as an adverb (Talagi 2004: 7).

However in English law it has not been very clear what the adverb 'corruptly' means, or what it adds to the description of acceptance of a payment. So a new definition of corruption was proposed in the British parliament in 2003, but the Bill was not passed[2].

Samoa's Secret Commissions Act 1975 talks in terms of 'principals' and 'agents', rather like the 2003 UK Bill would have done. It makes it an offence for an agent to receive a gift or inducement to act, or show favour or disfavour, in relation to the principal's business or affairs 'without the consent of the principal' (section 5(1)) (So'o et al 2004: 9). The Public Service Act makes it an offence for an official to 'accept any money fee or gratuity or reward for any kind of service provided' without the express permission of the Public Service Commission (So'o et al 2004: 9). This principal-agent framework, adopted in the economist Robert Klitgaard's influential 1988 book *Controlling Corruption*, and by the Hong Kong legislation that its Independent Commission Against Corruption (henceforth ICAC) operates under, is adaptable to both public and private sectors. In the public sector the principal is the public service commissioner, or departmental head, whereas in the private sector it might be the CEO. In both cases the offence lies in receiving benefits without their permission.

Leadership Codes are varieties of legal talk. Offences tend to be less strongly sanctioned (for example by dismissal) and more easily prosecuted (in tribunals rather than courts). In some ways they are like professional codes of practice, supposed to be enforced by example and peer pressure as well as the threat of expulsion. The idea of a Leadership Code for senior officials and politicians was introduced at independence in PNG in 1975 (from Africa), and then copied by Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (Larmour 2005b: 104-105). More recently they have been promoted by the Pacific Islands Forum. These leadership codes are administered by the Ombudsmen in PNG and Vanuatu and by a distinct office in Solomon Islands.

The audience here will know Vanuatu's leadership code commission was set up with technical assistance from PNG, and its first commissioner produced a stream of scathing reports on the corruption and incompetence of ministers and officials. Parliament, stung, repealed the legislation establishing her office in 1998. A new parliament passed new legislation limiting its powers in some ways, but expanding its responsibilities in others (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004: 23). She was eventually replaced with a quieter figure, but continues to campaign in the local branch of TI. Meanwhile little action seems to have followed her reports.

The law may also be a silencer of talk about corruption. Defamation laws can silence critics of corruption in government, and have been used again and again against Akilisi Pohiva the Pro-democracy campaigner and commoner MP in Tonga. However he has won cases as well as lost them (James and Tufui 2004: 20). Pohiva also successfully

[2] legal practioner.com/regulation accessed 28 May 2009

sued the government for unfair dismissal over the radical content of a radio programme he broadcast (James and Tufui 2004: 20). Ten years later he and the editor and deputy editor of *Taimi o Tonga* were arrested over a leak of information about senior officials abusing overtime payments, and other offences but were released by the Chief Justice.

Corruption and Legal Pluralism

At least three strands in legal pluralism, as distentangled by Miranda Forsyth (2009), seem relevant to understanding corruption and anti-corruption: scepticism about state law; process vs norms; and heterogeneity of domains.

1. Skepticism about state law

The first point is that the criminal law doesn't seem to work very well against corruption, not just in the Pacific. One the one hand, the offence hard to investigate and prosecute. The absence of a victim makes it difficult to build up a case. The complexity of financial wrongdoing frustrates the efforts of untrained investigators. On the other hand, the law itself often seems to frustrate action against corruption. Laws on defamation protect the powerful against exposure. The rich and powerful can afford the best lawyers.

Perversely, those responsible for investigation and prosecution are most vulnerable to corruption themselves. The Hong Kong and NSW Independent Commissions Against Corruption were created in response to police corruption (their original 'independence' was from the police, who were found incapable of policing themselves). TI's surveys of popular experience of corruption find that – among government agencies - it is the police that are most likely to ask them for a bribe (transparency International 2006). Procedural requirements create opportunities for delay and corruption within the legal system.
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This is nothing new, and is why we have created tribunals and commissions with (on the one hand) special powers to override restraints on wiretapping and so on, and (on the other) more relaxed rules about evidence. Some – like New South Wales ICAC – use public shaming in requirements that officials tell the truth in public hearings (with whatever they say not be usable in subsequent prosecutions). There is a much written on leadership codes and commissions in the Pacific, but it would be hard to say that any have really worked (particularly in relation to the high public expectations of them).

Anti-corruption can also be used as an instrument of intimidation by selective enforcement. Fiji's so-called ICAC is far from independent of the executive: no independent commissioner has been appointed, and the deputy is an army officer, Colonel Langman.. In spite of its attempts to distance itself from the governments earlier 'cleanup campaign', and to professionalise its work, and to deal with wrongdoing in its own ranks, there is widespread suspicion it is targeting the government's political

enemies (Larmour 2008). Where corruption is rife, the decision about whom to prosecute and whom to let go is highly political.

Finally, as economists remind us we, regulation itself creates opportunities for corruption. Price control creates opportunities for black marketing. Complicated customs regulations create opportunities for deliberate misclassification. Exemptions are open to abuse, and so on. This suspicion was crisply expressed in Robert Klitgaard's influential (1988) formula

Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability.

The anti-anti- corruption research identified another downside of the use of law to deal with corruption. The pioneers of this approach were Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996), who looked at the deleterious effects of what they called 'the anti corruption project' on public administration in New York. Successive scandals led to the creation of layers and layers of supervision that were making the ordinary business of government hard to carry out. So many firms were blacklisted that, for example, that few were available to tender for public contracts. A new system of embedding auditors within projects was beginning to free up a system paralysed by over supervision.

2 Process vs Norms

A traditional approach to corruption in developing countries saw misinterpretation: what looks to a Westerner to be a bribe is merely a gift; what looks like nepotism is merely traditional concern with family. The Indonesian sociologist Syed Alatas (1968) criticised this relativistic approach as patronizing and condescending: the West was denying moral agency to people in developing countries. Transparency International's Source Book (Pope 2000) sternly denounces cultural arguments as 'myths' and 'excuses'. I am regularly warned by colleagues of the dangers of 'relativism'. This universalism seems to me excessive. Some relativism was necessary, for example as political theorist Philp (2002) argued: definitions of corruption depend on some (often-implicit) image of the ideal, which has become corrupt. That might be (for an economist) be the ideal of a freely competitive market. For a monarchist it might be a just monarch. For a civil servant it might be the ideal of a Weberian bureaucracy and so on. For a traditionalist it might be Kastom. When you start asking what is relative to what, some kinds of relativism seem, inevitable (Baghramian 2004)

In the current book I tried to dilute the argument about contrasting standards, criteria or norms, by putting them in wider context of what people were actually thought and did about behaviour (or people) they might define as corrupt[3]. The NIS studies did identify differences between 'the west' and local definitions – for example as between whether

[3] The distinction between process and norms is rather like the distinction anthropologists used to make but culture as a matter of symbols and meaning as opposed to culture as a whole way of life, including its material conditions see Kuper 1999

the giver or receiver was blameworthy. But these differences were fewer than an out and out relativist might expect (and the 'Western' definition was far from monololithic, Gorta 2005). The word or concept might be hard to translate into Pacific languages, but it was not untranslatable – or the word 'korapt' was borrowed to refer to it. There are indigenous traditions of appropriate behaviour by leaders. From the evidence of the NIS studies, the bigger differences seemed to me to be in general suspiciousness of corruption, willingness to report it, reaching decisions about it, implementing those and forgiving or punishing those found responsible.

In Miranda's legal pluralist language, there seemed to be excessive concern with the norm (is this person or act corrupt or not) and not enough concern with process: what are people prepared to do about it. I framed evidence from the NIS studies in terms of a standard idea in the study of Public Policy – the idea of a policy cycle in which problems are identified responded to an acted against. The points of difference between Pacific Islands countries and with (say) Australia are listed in Table 2, and discussed in more detail below.

Table 2

Points at which different understandings of Corruption matter

In general suspicion of corruption

In the identification of particular people or behaviour as corrupt

In the seriousness with which it is taken

In willingness to criticise and report

In reaching authoritative judgments

In implementing the authoritative judgements

In punishment and forgiveness

Source Larmour 2008

Differences in general suspicion of corruption Gunnar Mydal (1968), writing about South Asia, talked of the 'folklore of corruption'. The Samoan National Integrity System report talks of a general public suspicion of corruption, not based on particular evidence, but a result of the governments 'secure grip on power' and its track record in the 1990s (So'o et al 2004: 11). This suspicion was hard to shake off. Similarly the Solomon Islands

report coins the phrase 'insidious tolerance' in which 'people express suspicion of corrupt activity at the slightest indication, but at the same time are willing to accept inaction concerning that suspicion' (Roughan 2004: 9). The culture here may be a culture of suspicion, which may be exaggerated or well founded. Its opposite might be the 'trust' that writers on social capital give importance to.

Differences in the identification of particular people or behaviour as corrupt This is the point at which Forsyth's norms, or the law, come into play. It is the point at which people have to consider whether they think a particular action – or inaction – is corrupt, or not. (They may also consider it bad for other reasons, but not corruption). It looks like a solitary decision, but it is in fact a social event. It involves language, and in practice is likely to involve the to-ing and fro-ing of discussion with colleagues or friends or family (or some kind of internal dialogue reproducing these interactions). This process may refer to what others have done before, or would do, and involve role models, childhood injunctions, and the examples set by characters in folktales or the media.

In Vanuatu, according to Newton Cain and Jowitt 'Chiefs who tell individuals how to vote after receiving bribes or goods for their villages are sometimes perceived as corrupt, but not always. The person offering the bribe is, however, acting corruptly' (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004 10). Similarly in Nauru, people encouraging or benefiting from corruption tend not to be regarded as corrupt themselves. Where people are paid to vote one way or another 'The blame attaches to the person who offers the temptation rather than the person who accepts it' (Kun et al 2004: 9).

Differences in the seriousness with which it is taken. Corruption may be taken less seriously than it is (now) by donors. Epeli Hau'ofa created several tales around the fun of fooling donors in an imaginary Pacific Island country very like Tonga (1994). Some assessment of seriousness is going to be necessary for any practical action, which will have costs in everyone'sl time. Assessment of seriousness is an important part of anti corruption policy. It is easy for an agency or campaign to get bogged down in trivial examples, and miss the more serious manifestations.

In FSM people don't see that misappropriated money is 'taken out of the pockets of citizens' (Hill 2004: 12). In Nauru carelessness may have been higher when people thought 'resources were in abundance' (Kun at al 2004: 11). In Vanuatu 'grassroots' people saw the activities of law and government as 'irrelevant to their everyday life' and as a consequence 'did not place any burden of expectation on their leaders' (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004: 5). People only got concerned when they saw their own money was at stake, as in the riots that followed revelations about National Provident Fund money.

Differences in willingness to criticise and report The Cook Islands report talks of 'fear of reprisal: 'people would rather live with the consequences of corrupt politicians than face losing their jobs' (Ingram 2004: 12). In Tonga people won't report others because of

'shame to the family involved, damage to the social fabric, and the breaking of relationships' (James and Tufui 2004: 10). In FSM 'it is very improper to question or openly criticize others or cause someone to lose face' (Hill 2004: 11). In Palau 'quiet and subtle scorn' was preferred to overt rebuke, and 'indirectness' was a virtue.

In Solomon Islands there has been 'lack of public or institutional pressure to redress blatant corruption acts'. The report points to 'a marked unwillingness of leading individuals' in the relevant institutions (Roughan 2004: 11). The Fiji report argues that in small societies with strong cultural ties "everyone knowing each other makes the act of ignoring illegal practices" easier than "blowing the whistle"' (Olaks Consulting 2001).

However in FSM it was suggested that people were reluctant to report less from fear of reprisal than from the expectation that they will 'get their chance' to benefit corruptly next (Hill 2004 12).

Differences in reaching authoritative judgments This is the point at which courts may become involved. The report on Tonga found that people can 'hide behind the culture' because there were no authoritative guidelines to 'distinguish between cultural practice and corruption' though a planned Code of Conduct for Public Servants might help (James and Tufui 2004: 5).

The courts in Kiribati have been particularly engaged in drawing lines between appropriate and inappropriate gift giving in Kiribati. The courts are required to take custom into account in deciding cases (Mackenzie 2004: 6). Following a series of cases involving ministers and campaigns the Kiribati electoral ordinance was amended as follows in 1997.

> Any person making a customary offering to a Maneaba (meeting house) referred to in i-Kiribati as 'Mweaka', 'Moanei' or 'Ririwete', with the sole intention of showing respect for the customs and traditions of Kiribati shall not be guilty of bribery (Mackenzie 2004: 9).

The Kiribati courts have also got involved in distinguishing between 'respect for customs and tradition' and 'intention to influence voters'. For example, in the custom of *bubuti* it is acceptable for someone lacking in [certain] resources to make a specific request to another who is better endowed' (Mackenzie 2004: 9, quoting Chief Justice Williams). Such requests were being made in the form of a fine demanded of a candidate visiting a Maneaba, and had involved (for example) a chainsaw or a video set. The court decided the issue depended on the intention of the giver. In the case before them the High court found the gifts 'were made because of custom. The candidates had no choice' (Mackenzie 2004: 9). In a similar case in Tuvalu - that the candidate had provided chiefs with food and drink prior to a by-election, and that chiefs had promised the votes of their villagers in return – the High Court found the feasting to be in accordance with custom rather than 'corrupt practices' (Taafaki 2004: 15).

Differences in implementing the authoritative judgements Police typically have a great deal of discretion as to whether or not they investigate and – later – go on to prosecute offences. Police may be corrupt themselves, though the complaints in the NIS studies tended to be more about competence and professionalism than corruption. However, police were not implementing the law against relatives in FSM, and in PNG police performance was 'watered down by lack of capacity, political influence and regionalism' (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 27).

Differences in punishment and forgiveness The Cook Islands report notes a recent successful prosecution for Secret Commissions that 'public attitudes are often sympathetic' to the person found guilty. It rehearses what people often said: 'We feel sorry for his children', 'How much did the community lose from his criminal actions?' and 'The community did not suffer any loss' (Ingram 2004: 12). There are no obvious victims, so the principles of restorative justice might suggest leniency. In Nauru, as in PNG, people who are the subject of headlines or gossip 'continue to be re-elected' (Kun at al 2004: 9). In FSM there was 'a willingness to ignore or forget transgressions by leaders' (Hill 2004: 8). In Vanuatu, people who have been damned in Ombudsman Commission reports 'continue to get elected' (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004 10). And in Nauru, every time a new President is elected, there is a batch of presidential pardons (Kun at al 2004: 18). In Kiribati, however, a decline in cultural sanctions – in this case ostracism of those involved in theft – was contributing to the rise of petty corruption among junior officials (Mackenzie 2004: 10).

3. Heterogeneity of domains

The influential modern definition of corruption as 'the use of public office for private gain' imagines a very simple world divided into two domains: the public and the private. It is consistent with common law and criminal code definitions of corruption as a public service matter of misconduct in office. And it is convenient to those suspicious of any kind of state action. But it doesn't take much reflection to see the difficulties it raises: what if the use is for family, regional, or party gain? What about the motives of the perpetrator (so called 'noble cause' corruption – the Fiji coup leader's defence). And what about corruption in the private sector, or a third domain of NGOs?.

A political scientist, Mark Warren (2004) has argued that this kind of definition is useful but out of date. It is characteristically liberal, growing out of eighteenth century fears of absolute monarchies trampling over individual freedoms (as in the US revolution). But, says Warren, it doesn't comprehend the complexity and multiplicity of domains of power in modern societies (eg in big corporations, or the media). Nor does have anything particular to say about democracy.

The idea of 'fraud', by contrast, works across public and private sectors. So does the idea of 'secret commissions; which gets its theoretical justification from arguments in

institutional economics about relationship between principals and agents. The Hong Kong ICAC for example has jurisdiction over public and private sectors, and most of its activity now concerns the latter (the public sector having been largely cleaned up). It frames corruption in terms of unauthorised receipt of benefits. The authorising could be a private sector manager, or a public sector supervisor.

Even within the public sector, there is a kind of vertical heterogeneity of domains. An anti corruption commission can only deal with a tiny fraction of cases of corruption. Much of their time is spent in deciding that complaints are outside their jurisdiction, or non-serious enough to be dealt with by them. A leadership code commission must decide at whom it counts as 'leaders', and leave the rest for others to deal with – Solomon Islands tried to include all public servants and became immobilised.

When we look into (and reflect on) peoples' workplaces, we find all sorts of grey areas, irregular activities condoned by management, 'work arounds' and so on. When I was working as a Research Assistant in 1970s, coding surveys, I was told by my workmates to inflate my pay claims, as 'everyone does it' and in any case management turned a blind eye, as they recognised pay rates were too low[4].

It's a familiar ideas that technical and professional domains must and should regulate themselves. Andrew Brien (2001) argues that codes of practice must reflect the specific dilemmas and temptations of particular professions: a code governing the professional practice of engineers, for example, is likely to address different issues than one governing teachers. Corruption among doctors or academics has typically been left to the professions, through peer pressure and (ultimately) withdrawal of accreditation. It may not work very well – but then nor does the criminal law (or example in medical malpractice). Within my university for example we have been developing elaborate ways of discouraging students from 'plagiarism' a form of corruption of the academic process that is just normal practice in the public service.

In Vanuatu influential professions like real estate or financial services may practice forms of self-regulation. However but the domains that most concerned Miranda Forsyth, and public policy in Vanuatu, are between the introduced and the traditional. The Samoa NIS report coined the useful phrase 'traditional integrity system', and Vanuatu, like some other Pacific regimes (but not PNG) has always been willing to embrace chiefs (and imagine that chiefs might misbehave too). Miranda describes suspicions of favoritism and bias among chiefs (2009: 117-118) and ways the Chiefs bill was stripped of provisions to deal with chiefly integrity (2009: 117-118). In this resistance to external regulation chiefs may be no different to politicians.

Corruption often presents itself as a dilemma between the expectations of different domains: responsibilities towards kin, as opposed to responsibilities to the public. Behaviour that is acceptable in one domain may not be acceptable in another. In activities

[4] eg see Ledeneva 2006 on 'informal practices' in the former Soviet Union, or Brehm and Gates on 'working, shirking and sabotage' among US Federal bureaucrats, or Anteby 2009 on 'quiet rule breaking'

like forum shopping, which Miranda discussed, we can choose which to inhabit for a while. The discussion of public vs private above, and everyday experience tell us that they are not just two, but multiple, coexisting domains (jn the terms of Miranda's title: many wings rather than two). As Miranda often points out the result is confusion (which often benefits those who can take advantage of it).

The most vexing domain difference (and the subject of another chapter in my corruption book) is that between 'politicians' and 'officials'. The Leadership Code framework elides the difference between these domains, treating both as varieties of 'leader'. And their roles overlap at the top of public services where politically appointed officials, who may be on contract rather than tenured, and ministers themselves try to mediate between parliament and the civil service. But politicians have quite different life-world, tasks, and careers from civil servants. It is a losing battle to try and make them behave like civil servants, and civil servants often cannot imagine the dilemmas a politician might face[5].

A legal pluralist approach might distinguish a parliamentary ethics office from one dealing with corruption by permanent officials. At least, the development of a leadership code should involve politicians, and deal with the realities and dilemmas of their jobs in the Pacific Islands (which often includes intense pressure from constituents who are not only the innocent victims of corruption, but enthusiastic beneficiaries)

Conclusions

(to come)

[5] In trying to make politicians behave like civil servants some anti corruption rhetoric is indistinguishable from 'anti-politics', a distinct kind of political movement that pretends it is not one (Ferguson 1994, Hindess 1997). It is an uncomfortable fact that the two most often cited successes in anti corruption campaigns – in Hong Kong and Singapore – have taken place in authoritarian circumstances: a one party state in Singapore; and a late colonial government in Hong Kong. Anti-politics is also a feature of the cleanup campaign and establishment of FICAC in Fiji

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